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Introduction
Deborah Ahrens
It is a pleasure to introduce the Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Symposium issue, Jails and Prisons: Rights, Re-Entry, and Reform. This
symposium brought together a spectrum of voices to discuss the most
pressing issue facing people who are incarcerated and people rejoining
communities, and the authors challenge us to consider how best to support
the well-being and rights of people in prison; to encourage and support
reform and restoration; and to facilitate reintegration of people who have
experienced incarceration. This issue also incorporates consideration of
people whose experiences with law and detention are rooted in family law
and immigration – children and families whose lives are dramatically
altered by their legal interactions, and whose interests also would be served
by legal reforms.
Karlton “Knowledge” Daniel’s poem, Mistaken Identity, sets the stage
for this issue. Daniel tackles systemic antiblack racism head-on, describing
the lies people in power use to frame and punish, and the failure of the
constitution to provide adequate safeguards. He reminds us of the lengthy
sentences in facilities that themselves create crime, where “they take your
good and make it bad.” Daniel takes the language of criminal law –
conspiracy, Class A Criminal, mistaken identity – and turns it around to
illustrate the criminal law’s own failings. Daniel’s poem is unflinching in
its portrayal of the racism harms of punishment.
People released from prison face barriers to community reintegration,
and, even once they serve their formal sentences, endure collateral
consequences that are not part of the judicially-prescribed punishment. One
such consequence is that people with criminal convictions experience
housing insecurity and have difficulty securing rental residences, even
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though access to safe and affordable housing is fundamental for reentering
people. In Criminal Record Based Housing Discrimination Harms Public
Safety, Professor Christopher Poulos narrates his own difficulties obtaining
housing as a person with a criminal conviction history – while he was able
to obtain national security clearance to intern at the White House during
law school, he had considerably more trouble securing an apartment to live
in while he interned. Still, as Professor Poulos notes, as a white man in a
business suit, he had less difficulty than a friend of his who was MexicanAmerican. As Professor Poulos argues, barriers to reintegration, perversely,
encourage reversion to illegal behavior, and those barriers are exacerbated
by the already-limited supply of low-income housing. His solution is
comprehensive – create robust law to prevent housing discrimination;
subsidize housing for persons with criminal histories who need assistance,
and expand housing voucher eligibility to include people who are not on
community supervision; and creatively use public lands and vacant
buildings to expand available housing.
What do you do when you experience a law-and-order era and are left
with lengthy sentences and regret? Jennifer Smith and Jeremiah Bourgeois
give us a roadmap in The Retroactive Application of Justice: Using
Prosecutorial Discretion to Correct Sentences that No Longer Serve a Valid
Purpose. The 1980s were such an era—several changes in Washington law
drove sentencing increases and, expensively, aged the state’s prison
population, including the introduction of sentencing guidelines; the
elimination of parole; and three-strikes-and-you’re-out approaches to
certain felonies. Those changes have engendered hardships for multiple
interests – the state, now paying for lengthy sentences; individuals,
disincentivized to seek and demonstrate rehabilitation, or be rewarded for it;
and victims, who favor restorative approaches. These sentencing changes
have not affected everyone equally – defendants face racial disparities
throughout. The authors note the central role of prosecutors in criminal law
and their historically limited ability to reduce confinement terms once they
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are meted out. New Washington law offers prosecutors an avenue to move
to reduce sentences, at which point the court is directed to consider the
person’s disciplinary record, evidence of rehabilitation, reduced risk of
future crime, and changed circumstances since sentencing. As people
mature, the recklessness of youth subsides, and the authors argue for
increased encouragement for and recognition of the power of rehabilitation.
In Sentencing Alternative to an Insanity Defense, Michael Mullan
observes the current difficulties that jurisdictions may face in incorporating
mental illness into punishment decisions as he critiques Kahler v. Kansas, a
recent Supreme Court case that upheld Kansas’s abolition of the affirmative
insanity defense. In Kahler, the prosecution and defense agreed that the
defendant had, at the time of the multiple killings he committed,
experienced depression – the question was what the law should do with his
mental health information. The State of Kansas had, in response to insanity
verdicts in cases involving the killing of police officers, abolished its
excuse defense of insanity, limiting consideration of mental illness to the
negation of mens rea during the guilt phase of a trial, and mitigation
information during sentencing. Mullan notes that mental illness in theory
would reduce a defendant’s sentencing exposure, but that, because judges
consider future dangerousness, may serve more as aggravating evidence
that increases a sentence. Mullan notes other approaches that might better
address mental health evidence, such as sentence reductions directly based
on mental health evidence; as the Supreme Court has offered states more
latitude to determine how mental illness should affect sentencing, Mullan
gives us a helpful critique of Kahler and a framework for navigating a postKahler criminal law regime.
Multiple authors in this issue document the difficulties people who are
incarcerated face. In Access Denied: How 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) Violates the
First Amendment Rights of Indigent Prisoners, Molly Guptill Manning
illustrates why those problems prove hard to remedy, and tells us how to
amend or repeal federal legislation to better permit people who are
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incarcerated to seek relief for their conditions. The Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) is another artefact of the law-and-order movement of
the 1980s and 1990s, and, by design, created barriers for incarcerated
people who wished to challenge their sentences or their prison conditions.
While people who are unable to pay court costs normally can claim in
forma pauperis status and avoid a filing fee, prisoners, and only prisoners,
are still required to pay that fee, which has itself increased substantially
since passage of the PLRA. Where a court has dismissed three or more of
the incarcerated person’s cases for being frivolous, malicious, or failing to
state a claim, the incarcerated person must pay that entire filing fee upfront. Courts continuously uphold challenges to the fee requirements by
reasoning that prisoners can work while incarcerated and save the money
for fees, but Manning demonstrates that employment opportunities are
limited, and pay is often nominal or nonexistent. Even where an
incarcerated person is able to save, states may first take those savings to
address LFOs and other expenses. Manning argues that incarcerated
persons thus face serious impediments to remedying their incarcerative
conditions through litigation, and outlines how the governing federal statute
can be amended or repealed to remove barriers for people who are
incarcerated.
Many people who have not been convicted of any crimes spend years in
facilities that, in every sense, resemble prisons, and that, often, afford
people even fewer protections. In An End to Inhumane Detention:
Washington Must Ban Private Detention Centers and Strengthen
Protections for Detained Immigrants, Ariana Headrick documents the many
unacceptable hardships endured by immigrants in detention centers, and
advocates the elimination of private detention centers as a way to ensure
both that detention centers are politically accountable and that fewer people
will be held in detention. As Headrick narrates, the Northwest ICE
Processing Center illustrates the constellation of problems that people who
are detained endure – physical and verbal abuse at the hands of the officers
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who are supposed to protect them; inadequate medical care; poor nutrition;
overcrowding; lack of access to family and counsel; and devastatingly, lack
of adequate COVID-19 safety measures. Washington would not be a
pioneer – Headrick notes that California banned new private detention
center contracts as of 2019 – but she also urges Washington to honor its
current trend toward protecting its immigrants by adopting measures to
more stringently regulate immigration detention centers, ensuring that the
public facilities remaining provide care, visitation with family and lawyers,
and protect personal liberty and privacy.
During the past several years, an increasing number of children from the
Northern Triangle – Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras – have fled
poverty and violence and have arrived, unaccompanied, in the United
States. These young people often have experienced trauma – at home,
during their journeys, and upon arrival. In Children Beyond Borders:
Extending Protections for Abandoned, Abused, and Neglected
Unaccompanied Children and Youth, Rosa Aguilar tells us about the
distances these children travel, and the complicated immigration systems
they must navigate even while trying to process the effects of their own
trauma. While there are avenues for easing the burdens on these young
immigrants, those avenues can be themselves difficult to traverse. Aguilar
focuses on one such remedy – the provision of Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status (SIJS) to children – and argues that this status was intended by
Congress to provide a pathway for juvenile immigrants to lawful permanent
residence. Children are denied that status, however, where the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services fails to consent, which it may do if it
finds that a minor primarily is seeking an immigration benefit rather than
relief from abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Aguilar argues that this denial
option is not aligned with other immigration measures for unaccompanied
minors, however, and proposes both an elimination of the consent
requirement and an increase in the number of SIJS grants to immigrant
youths.
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Incarceration and supervision are not the only burdens of a criminal
conviction or a delinquency determination. In Footing the Bill for Juvenile
Justice: The Impacts of Legal Financial Obligations on Washington Youth,
Tori Sullivan Lavoie outlines the sorts of legal financial obligations (LFOs)
that also attend criminal convictions, and argues to eliminate them entirely
for juveniles. While LFOs – restitution, fees, and other court costs – may
present inconvenience for financially-supported young people, they present
significant burdens for young people who do not have economic means, and
the debts trail them into adulthood, where they serve as barriers to jobs and
housing. In Washington State, as Lavoie tells us, juveniles enjoy more
consideration than in many states – state legislation limits LFOs on
juveniles to situations where the LFO is expressly authorized by statute,
although restitution, for example, has no statutory limit. Most troubling for
young people, outstanding LFO balances can bar a young person from
sealing a juvenile record. At the same time, while a state may impose LFOs
to offset the costs of criminal law, low collection rates mean that LFOs are
ineffective as funding methods, and juveniles are poorly situated to pay
their assigned costs. Lavoie outlines the specific statutory changes that
would get us to a better result – where juveniles no longer would face the
imposition of LFOs, period.
In Stopping the Flow: Eliminating the School-to-Prison Pipeline in
Washington State, Emily Justin argues for an end to the use of exclusionary
disciplinary procedures in Washington schools. Justin illustrates the
disparate, disproportionate effects of these disciplinary practices on students
of color; students with disabilities; students who have experienced trauma;
and, particularly, students with intersecting identities that place them in
more than one of these categories, and shows that the disparate imposition
of exclusionary discipline starts in preschool and carries through to high
school. These policies, particularly as paired with zero-tolerance measures,
impede academic engagement and performance, and lead to higher drop-out
rates, as children are left without school structure. These children become
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more at risk for eventual criminal law intervention. Justin shows us that the
abolition of such punishment practices will lead to better outcomes – fewer
kids out of school, and fewer kids ultimately in incarcerative facilities.
Jamie Wilson opens her article, Juvenile Dependency Proceedings:
Dismantling Families Without Probable Cause, with a provocative
observation – we value children more than we value personal property, but
removing children from a home currently does not, in practice, require court
approval. Wilson notes that in theory, authorities require a court order to
remove a child from the child’s family unless they are in danger of
imminent harm, but that authorities commonly remove first and obtain a
court order later. Child removal has serious, lasting consequences for the
child and for the family – while the Constitution and the state legislature
recognize the importance of the family unit, children are removed without
prior judicial approval even where no imminent danger presents. Removal
also generates disparate impacts by race and class – dependency statutes are
facially neutral, but they are not applied in a neutral fashion, and Wilson
documents disparities from reporting to investigating to reunification.
Wilson argues to use an existing framework – the search warrant process –
as a basis for rewriting dependency statutes to create greater impediments to
removal, offering children and families similar protections to property.
People who are incarcerated; young people; and immigrants are some of
the most vulnerable members of our society; we are proud to offer the
voices of these authors as they work to transform the law to support our
communities.
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